From Strasbourg to Amsterdam: Prospects for the Convergence of European Social Rights Policy by SCIARRA, Silvana
Law Department
From Strasbourg to Amsterdam: 
Prospects for the Convergence of 
European Social Rights Policy




























































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE 
DEPARTMENT OF LAW
EU I Working Paper LAW No. 98/9
From Strasbourg to Amsterdam: 
Prospects for the Convergence of 
European Social Rights Policy
S ilv a n  a Sc ia r r a
This paper was prepared for the project directed by Professor Philip Alston 
“A European Union Human Rights Agenda for the Year 2000”, and will appear 
in the forthcoming OUP book “The European Union and Human Rights”, 
edited by Philip Alston with the assistance of Mara Bustelo and James Heenan.




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© 1998 Silvana Sciarra 
Printed in Italy in December 1998 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































From Strasbourg to Amsterdam: Prospects for the Convergence of 
European Social Rights Policy
Silvana Sciarra'
I. A Historical Introduction: The Circulation of International Labour 
Standards
The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the persistent 
circulation within the European Union of international labour 
standards which are either inherent in the cultural and legal 
traditions of Member States or have become a relevant part thereof 
because of the slow and yet penetrating influence of international 
organisations. This argument will be developed in order to show 
that the interdependence of international legal sources is one of the 
many variables characterising the construction and consolidation of 
social rights within the European Union. The existence of different 
levels of decision-making, whereby nation states strenuously defend 
the competence and indeed the better ability of domestic 
legislatures to intervene in social matters, is a significant sign of the 
specificity and perhaps of the unpredictability of European 
integration in this field.
It will also be argued that, because of this specificity, justifiable on 
historical as well as political grounds, the most delicate task 
assigned to the reformers of the European legal order is to look for 
changes and adaptations, while not dispersing deeply rooted 
European legal values. Challenging in itself, this task must be 
pursued under the pressure of globalised markets, taking into 
account the uncertain borders of supranational legal systems. 
Nonetheless, the debate preceding the signature of the Amsterdam
’ I wish to thank Eeva Kolehmainen, researcher at the EUI, for providing invaluable 
assistance in the preparation of the bibliography and in obtaining the relevant 
documents and reference material. I am very grateful to Professors Philip Alston 
and David Harris for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. While the 
responsibility for omissions and mistakes is all mine, their suggestions proved 
extremely helpful in enhancing better communication between the language of 



























































































Treaty showed signs of a stronger commitment, both in political and 
academic circles; it is important to underline this, even when facing 
disillusion for the lacunae which have not yet been filled.
The process of expanding social rights is an endless one. As such, 
it attracts the attention of all political actors and provokes the 
activism of institutions. It also represents for the present writer the 
best historical link with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights1, 
which is at the origin of this collective effort to suggest a critical 
analysis and to advance new proposals, taking it as a source of 
inspiration for its ‘universal’ and ‘positive’ affirmation of rights 
addressed to all men, rather than to citizens of a country or of a 
region. The language adopted for universal human rights usefully 
applies to social rights: ‘freedoms’ rest on the assumption that 
states will abstain from intervening, ‘powers’ require active state 
policies for their enforcement.2
This paper will concentrate on social rights and social policies 
resting within the domain of employment contracts: both the 
increasing activity of EC legislature and the attention paid to it by 
national labour law systems have opened up a wide research field. 
Active employment measures, as well as measures to fight 
unemployment must be included in this wide angle of legal analysis. 
This will bring new evidence to the philosophical distinction between 
‘freedoms’ and ‘powers’ and will transfer the practical consequences 
of this to the process of expansion and enrichment of a 
supranational legal order.
A. The Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome: Two Early Visions 
on Social Rights
1 Adopted and proclaimed by GA Res. 217 A (III) (1948). In United Nations, A 
Compilation of International Instruments. Volume 1, Part 1 (1994) 1.
2 N. Bobbio, 'Presente e avvenire dei diritti deH’uomo’, in L’età dei diritti (1990) 17, 
and especially 41. Mengoni argues that social rights are an expansion of the 
principle of equality and are linked to emerging needs of the civil society, whereas 
fundamental freedoms are historically meant to protect the individual against 
political power. Unlike the latter, social rights do not bring about direct 
enforceability as individual subjective rights, but objectively bind the legislature. 




























































































In looking back at the early days of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) we find a valuable confirmation of the theory 
according to which European integration was oriented towards 
functional objectives, reflecting specific national interests, rather 
than well identified common interests. Furthering a broader political 
plan and achieving a more consistent interdependence of the 
economic systems appeared a very improbable objective because 
of the dominating strength of national interests. Specific 
peculiarities were nonetheless visible within the European 
Community; nothing but a ‘false analogy’ could be made when 
comparing the EC with other international organisations active at 
the same time, since none of them raised the problem of limiting 
national sovereignty while achieving co-operation.3
This is a crucial point in the understanding of social policies 
developments and must be read in conjunction with the introduction 
in the Treaty of Rome of unanimity as the golden rule in decision 
making within the European Council. If we go back to the Coal and 
Steel Community, we find an interesting key for the interpretation of 
early social measures, which can also be used in framing later 
developments in the field. As part of the aids addressed by the 
Community to the two industrial sectors in question, social 
measures were subordinate to the fact that major economic choices 
had to be favoured within some nation states, in order to enhance 
the competitiveness of the newly born common market, by favouring 
free trade of coal and steel.
Restructuring or closure of activities brought with it unemployment 
benefits for coal miners, training for dislocated steel-workers, 
financial aid to move to other jobs and similar measures which 
showed the purely instrumental nature of social protection. The 
main guarantee for workers had to do with the availability of 
resources allowing them to change occupation4; this was quite an 
extraordinary measure, when we think that at the time in which it
3 A.S. Milward, ‘L’Europa in formazione', in M. Aymard, P. Bairoch, W. Barberis 
and C. Ginzburg, Storia d'Europa (1993) 196.



























































































was conceived, the prevailing pattern was that of permanent and 
never changing employment. Since the High Authority did not have 
any power to intervene in social policies, it was remarkable to 
achieve all this through co-operation among nation states. What 
was favoured, in the absence of normative powers, was the 
gathering of information on national labour law systems which 
resulted in very interesting early attempts to build up a common 
legal culture, through comparative analysis.5
It can be maintained that a negative - albeit very pragmatic - 
rationale inspired social measures at that time, since social aids 
were considered to be a mere repercussion of broad industrial 
policies, lacking in continuity and in autonomy, linked as they were 
to decisions of a political and economic nature, taken at the national 
level. This explanation can also be read in the light of contemporary 
events and measured against the aforementioned inability of states 
to surrender sovereignty in favour of common social goals.
This is still a reality within the European Union, particularly, as we 
shall see further on, when measures on employment are at stake.
In the Treaty of Rome, the debate on European social rights was 
influenced by the weakness and narrowness of the legal basis and 
by the strict connection established with mechanisms of market 
regulation, in order to avoid distortion in competition. These two 
points made the development of social policies largely dependent 
on competition rules; principles of fairness and efficiency within the 
market included only a limited number of social rules and made 
them functional to goals which would, otherwise, be considered 
outside the scope of national labour law systems.
The Spaak Report (1956)6 is an illuminating document in this 
respect, inasmuch as it shows the theoretical inspiration which then
5 Sciarra, 'European Social Policy and Labour Law: Challenges and Perspectives', 
in 4 AEL (1995) 312.
6 Spaak Report: Comité Intergouvememental crée par la conférence de Messine, 
Rapport des Chefs de Délégations aux Ministères des Affaires Etrangères de 21 




























































































led the founding fathers to draw a map of social rights within the 
borderlines of economic efficiency. The Report thought that a 
‘gradual coalescence’ of social policies would become one of the 
elements of a well functioning common market. The pre-condition 
was that harmonisation could be furthered only where specific 
distortions in competition were visible. As a result of this the French 
government could ensure that labour law rules to be inserted into 
the Treaty would be measured against its own internal system, 
particularly with regard to parity of wages and social costs. It all 
resulted in the compromise of Article 117, characterised by its two 
sides, the first one being more prescriptive, the second one more 
predictive.7
This analysis, albeit from the very specific and perhaps limited 
perspective of social rights, confirms the overall interpretation, 
highlighted before, which sees the creation of a common market as 
the outcome of strong national economic interests, particularly 
French ones. First with the ECSC, then with the EEC, national 
post-war reconstruction had to proceed and be favoured, without 
obstacles in its way.8 It is not surprising that relevant articles in the 
Rome Treaty would be inspired by this philosophy and produce a 
mechanism whereby assimilation of national legal systems should 
be the last resort and the Commission should only be given the 
power either to grant subsidies to correct distortions or to promote 
collaboration among member states in the social field, as stated in 
Article 118.
Even Articles 119 and 120 - the former then become a cornerstone 
for equality legislation - were Inspired by French legislation and 
forced into the Treaty by the representatives of the French 
government. Both aimed at establishing equal rules governing
established at the Messina conference in June 1955 under the chairmanship of 
M.Paul Henri Spaak, then Belgian foreign minister.
7 Kahn-Freund, 'Labour Law and Social Security’, in E. Stein and T.L. Nicholson 
(eds), American Enterprise in the European Common Market. A Legal Profile, 
Volume 1 (1960) 300.




























































































contracts of employment, which would ensure the cohesion of the 
market.9
An important provision in the Treaty - regarded as the most 
significant achievement in the field10 - was Article 51, establishing 
the right of employees to social security measures, while moving 
freely within the common market. Both as the origin of very relevant 
legislation and as a fundamental principle established in order to 
counterbalance the risks inherent in labour mobility, this measure 
opens up a wide and complex scenario, the implications of which 
are still at the heart of institutional reforms both at a national and 
supranational level.
A strict unanimity rule had to govern the whole field, at least until the 
reforms brought about by the Single European Act in 1986. Before 
the timid derogation to such a principle, expressed in Article 118a 
(introduced by the SEA), Article 100 was the only legal basis for the 
approximation of social legislation. Unanimity was required for the 
directives on collective dismissals and transfers of undertakings 
adopted during the seventies. No doubt this legislation must be 
included in the list of important achievements of the Commission in 
the framework of its social action program. The attention shown 
towards important employees’ rights had nevertheless to be 
ascertained against the background of economic instability and 
industrial restructuring; distortions in competition, even at that later 
stage of economic integration, had to be avoided, the result being 
that social rights were once again made adaptable to the prevailing 
interests of companies, put under pressure by new market 
demands.
The marginal position of social rights within the Treaties of Paris 
and Rome can fruitfully be compared with other international 
sources. A line is drawn between economic, social and cultural 
rights on one side, and civil and political rights on the other, in the
9 Barnard, The Economic Objectives of Article 119’, in T.K. Hervey and D. O’Keefe 
(eds), Sex Equality Law in the European Union (1996) 32.




























































































United Nations human rights covenants of 1966." Although a lot 
has been said on the generation gap dividing the former rights from 
the latter, pointing out that values inspiring all human rights are by 
definition ‘variable’ and open to absorb changes due to cultural and 
social factors,12 it still remains true that the evolution of social rights 
continues to be much slower and highly controversial even in 
advanced legal systems.
Various historical reasons are behind this assertion, some of which 
may prove central to the argument which is developed in this paper, 
namely the importance to balance national traditions against the 
supranational construction of social rights and to keep this exercise 
in law making within a multi-level framework of competencies and 
compatibility. It will be maintained throughout this paper that when 
it comes to social rights the process of European integration must 
not be such to preclude national initiatives and obscure national 
traditions. In order to move into this direction, a digression will be 
necessary towards other international sources, different from 
Community sources and yet relevant for the understanding of 
current trends in the field.
Rather than attempting to offer a complete overview of relevant 
sources and of their enforcement, a few cases will be selected. 
This will be done in relation to one European country in particular, 
as far as ILO sources are concerned. The United Kingdom has in 
fact acquired a unique position in comparison to other countries of 
the Community, because of the drastic changes in labour legislation
11 See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by GA Res. 2200 A 
(XXI) (1966). International Instruments, note 1 above, at 8 and 20; and Eide, 
'Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’, in A. Eide, C. Krause and 
A. Rosas (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1995) 21. From this 
distinction, different from the overall approach followed in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights assumptions then followed according to which civil and political 
rights were to be considered 'absolute’ and 'immediate’, whereas social, economic, 
and cultural rights were ‘programmatic’ (Eide, at 22). Similar terms are adopted 
when describing the latter category of rights in Community sources. See below.



























































































brought about by the Conservative administrations, from 1979 
onwards.
Testing the new labour law regime against ILO standards proved to 
be a very important exercise, both for the quantity and the quality of 
condemnations undergone by the UK. The implications for 
European social rights are indirect and yet very relevant, as will be 
shown in the next section.
B. Renewed Centrality of ILO Standards - The Case of the United 
Kingdom
In the history of European social policies, the obstinate opposition 
shown by both the Thatcher and Major administrations to approving 
legislation in the social field leaves a very precise mark. On the one 
hand the limits inherent in unanimity voting and the difficulties to 
operate on the narrow and contested terrain of Article 118a became 
progressively more evident. This led to the Maastricht compromise 
which, by way of derogation to Article 148(2) of the Treaty, excluded 
the United Kingdom from the scope of the Agreement on Social 
policies.
On a different - and yet connected - side of labour law policies, the 
UK showed its reluctance to ratify new ILO Conventions (only one of 
the 25 Conventions adopted between 1979 and 1996 was ratified) 
and its readiness to denounce previous Conventions.13 While 
vetoing the approval of Community law, the UK wanted to prove the 
impenetrability of the system by international labour standards and, 
at the same time, wanted to show its ability to legislate against the 
main stream of fundamental principles shared by the majority of 
countries within the Community.
Two Conventions in particular were in the middle of the hurricane 
affecting the UK: conventions No. 87 (1948) and No. 98 (1949), 
dealing respectively with Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise and Right to Organise and Collective




























































































Bargaining14. Leading cases started in the public sector and had to 
do with the Government's attempt to exclude some categories of 
public servants from the scope of Convention No. 87.15 They were 
intertwined with cases on the limitation of the right to strike16 with 
the result that the whole conservative legislation in collective labour 
law was put under recurrent scrutiny and led to a series of 
condemnations.
Later on, the 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 
and particularly the narrow interpretation of this Act offered by the 
House of Lords17 kept busy all ILO bodies in order to preserve 
freedom of association from the invasion of limiting employers’ 
practices. It was held that Article 13 of the Act would ‘discourage’ 
collective bargaining if it was to be interpreted in the direction to 
allow the payment of incentives for employees moving from 
collective agreed terms and conditions of employment to individual 
contracts. Annual condemnation from the ILO towards the UK 
government became an exhausting ritual, in which the ILO showed
14 In ILO, International Labour Conventions and Recommendations, Volume 1 
(1996)435 and 524.
15 The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Case No. 1261, 234th 
Report of the Freedom of Association Committee, ILO, 87, on which see 
particularly Lord Wedderburn, The Worker and the Law (1986) 276. This case did 
not reach the Strasbourg Court due to the Commission on Human Rights’ decision 
that the restrictions in question were justified under Art. 11(2), ECJHRF or the 
consequences of this leading case and the still ongoing debate, see Mills, The 
International Labour Organisation, the United Kingdom and Freedom of 
Association: An Annual Cycle of Condemnation’, 2 EHRLR (1997) 43. See also 
Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (1995) and (1996); and Schoolteachers’ Pay and Working 
Conditions Case, Case No. 1391, 256th Report of the Freedom of Association 
Committee, ILO, 39-89.
As for GCHQ, the initiative was taken by the Government in the summer of 1997 to 
restore the right to belong to a trade union, although with some restrictions. See 
briefly on this, Hepple, note 13 above, at 365.
16 All analysed by Creighton, The ILO and Protection of Freedom of Association in 
the United Kingdom’, in K. Ewing, C. Gearty, and B. Hepple (eds), Human Rights 
and Labour Law (1994) 10.
17 Associated Newspapers Ltd v. Wilson and Associated British Ports v. Palmer, 




























































































its commitment and proved to have had long term perspective, 
waiting for substantial innovations to take place, once a change of 
government would occur.
In the early cases, the Committee on Freedom of Association and 
the Committee of Independent Experts were both called upon and 
made to play a very interesting institutional game, as for the 
competence each of them had on the matter, forcing the British 
Government to amend legislation when in breach of ILO 
Conventions.18 In the later cases too the ILO was able to 
substantiate its position with wide and well argued criticism of the 
legislation in its entirety. As a consequence of this long and 
controversial confrontation, a critical ground has been prepared for 
the new Labour Government; on its side, it would be hard to show 
scepticism and disregard towards international labour standards 
and to leave things as they are. There will be a need to go through 
previous legislation and revise it, while keeping a very close scrutiny 
of new legislation to be adopted in the field. Furthermore, ratifying 
ILO conventions will appear as an opportunity to gain consensus in 
the international community.
The widespread and convinced opposition expressed in scholarly 
work against the lowering of ILO standards19 was also accompanied 
by a militant view on the side of the unions. Such a discovery of a 
new centrality for the ILO and for its labour standards has run 
parallel to a more balanced and inspired position of British 
academia towards the EC. The contribution of British scholars, 
particularly labour lawyers, in building up a critical - and yet 
constructive - evaluation of Community social policies was 
remarkable. An analogy can be drawn with a similarly active role of 
practising lawyers, interest groups and specialised agencies in 
bringing cases to the ECJ, through preliminary ruling procedures.
18 Creighton, note 16 above, at 11.
19 K. Ewing, Britain and the ILO (1994); Wedderburn, ‘Labour Standards, Global 
Markets and Labour Laws in Europe’, in W. Sengenberger and D. Campbell, 




























































































Both examples show the misgiving of the British legal system to 
accept structural changes in labour law and the wish to keep some 
of its characteristics intact, by referring to international and 
Community sources.
This was a test of some importance for the ILO, especially at a time 
in which its political role appeared weaker, in the light of the new 
political order following the collapse of Eastern States, and because 
of the reduced weight of employees’ representatives within it.20 In a 
sense, the role played by the ILO with respect to British legislation 
would go against both these elements and indicate that, despite its 
feeble capacity to inflict sanctions, an international organisation can 
maximise its supervisory machinery and use its power to expose 
national governments to moral condemnation21 and to help them 
towards the Implementation of international standards.
However, despite the peculiarities inherent in a tripartite 
organisation like the ILO, in which standards are constantly revised 
and the voice of non-governmental organisations is regularly heard, 
the notion of 'best practice’, as the final outcome of political options 
made in enforcing labour standards, might need to be revisited.22 
This policy suggestion is also related to the increasingly stronger 
position of new organisations such as the WTO. The inclusion of 
labour standards within the regulation of free trade, despite the 
proclaimed commitment to the observance of ILO standards, may 
introduce dangerous limitations to the latter23.
20 Nussberger, ‘Summary of Discussions: Is the International Labour Organization 
in a State of Transition?’, in B. Maydell and A. Nussberger (eds), Social Protection 
by Way of International Law: Appraisal. Defecits and Further Development (1996) 
213-215.
21 Gaja, 'Organizzazione internazionale del lavoro’, XXI Enc. Dir. (1981); 
Bartolomei de la Cruz, 'Standard Setting Activities in the Field of Social and Labour 
Law: International Labour Law: Renewal or Decline?’, in Maydell and Nussberger, 
note 20 above, at 46.
22 Swepston, 'Supervision of ILO Standards, 13 Int. Jour, of Comp. Lab Law and 
Ind. Ref (1997) 344.




























































































Regional legal systems - like the Community system - need to be 
carefully evaluated, whilst questioning also the efficiency of 
international enforcement mechanisms. Homogeneity of technical 
standards can best be reached at a regional level, while maintaining 
a common core of fundamental principles. To take one example, 
currently in the public eye, flexibility within the labour market must 
be measured against binding minimum rules rather than being left to 
national legislatures with wide options.
This exercise becomes even more crucial for the cultural identity of 
a regional legal system if we look at the very general and often 
vague indications addressed to governments by institutions such as 
the World Bank.24 This is why the political and legal confrontation 
between the ILO and the UK becomes an exemplary case. It 
supports one of the main arguments in this paper, namely the need 
to strengthen fundamental social rights - and in particular the right to 
organise - at Community level and to adopt specific monitoring 
mechanisms which should aim at the convergence of international 
labour standards.
C. Article 11 of the ECHR: Shall We Listen to the Strasbourg 
Court?
In referring to the relevant sources of the Council of Europe, there is 
a tendency to confirm a separation of territories, historically 
significant, as well as politically remarkable: on one side the 
prevailingly individualistic approach of the 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights, on the other side the opening up of 
some collective rights in the 1961 European Social Charter.
Particularly if we take Article 11 of the ECHR, the most relevant 
within the general framework of this paper, we are bound to see the 
close correlation with the provisions of the ESC and the way these
24 The World Bank, World Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrating 
World (1995); ID, The State in a Changing World (1997). A classification of labour 
standards is offered by K.E. Maskus, 'Should Core Labour Standards be Imposed 





























































































two sources are made to function separately and yet in such a way 
that they can supplement each other.25 The ‘flavour of liberal 
principle combined with uncertainty of meaning',26 which can be 
tasted also in reading Article 11, makes the Charter an essential 
supplement to the ECHR. First defined as a big foot-note to the 
Convention,27 the Charter has been constantly improving its moral 
and legal standing and acquiring a position of its own among 
international sources.
Dynamism in this development is confirmed at first by the 1988 
Additional Protocol, which had the merit to expand the competence 
of the Charter to information and consultation rights, the most 
contemporary expression of the right to organise collectively.28 A 
Protocol amending the Charter followed In 1991, bearing important 
consequences for a more effective functioning of the Committee of 
Ministers and for the sanctions to be applied in cases of non- 
compliance.
Finally, we should mention the innovations brought about by the 
1995 Protocol on collective complaints, empowering NGOs, 
international and national organisations of workers and employers 
to bring complaints directly. This ‘model’ can be particularly useful 
in the discussion following the incorporation of the Maastricht Social 
Agreement into the Amsterdam Treaty. If we take the words of 
Article 1 of the 1995 Protocol, we can see an analogy with the 
status of the European social partners, namely that of ‘International 
organisations of employers and trade unions’. As much as the 
definitions coincide, the European organisations are given important
25 D. Harris, The European Social Charter ( 1984); D. Gomein, D. Harris, and L. 
Zwaak, Law and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
European Social Charter (1996).
26 Wedderburn, 'Freedom of Association or Right to Organise? The Common Law 
and International Sources', in Lord Wedderburn, Employment Rights in Britain and 
Europe (1991) 140.
27 Kahn-Freund, The European Social Charter’, in F.G. Jacobs (ed), European 
Law and the Individual (1976) 182.
28 Embarrassment for the non-ratification of the Protocol by the UK is reported by 
Shrubsall, 'The Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter - Employment 




























































































tasks within the overall architecture of the Treaty without any power 
to complain. Indeed, the ECJ’s competence to review collective 
agreements was debatable under the Maastricht Treaty29 and still 
remains so, under the new provisions, in the absence of any explicit 
mention to this effect.
In May 1996 a new version of the ESC was adopted, which should 
be running parallel to the previous one. New rights have been 
added at the end, in order to leave untouched the structure of the 
text and the division In parts I and II. Some of the new provisions 
are inspired by other international sources.30
The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly has expressed a 
strong commitment towards speeding up the process of ratification 
and introducing a distinct European Court of social rights to 
guarantee observance of obligations under the Charter.31
These recent developments should be kept in mind by observers 
and commentators of Community law developments; especially 
after the reference to the ESC Introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty, 
an approach oriented towards future changes should be adopted. 
While indirectly absorbing these new values into the ECJ’s frame of 
reference, account should be taken of a process which will bring 
about innovation,32 although the process of ratification of the new 
Charter might prove very slow and possibly disappointing. In
29 Sciarra, 'Collective Agreements in the Hierarchy of European Community 
Sources’, in P. Davies, A. Lyon-Caen, S. Sciarra, and S. Simitis, European 
Community Labour Law Principles and Perspectives, Liber Amicorum Lord 
Wedderburn (1996) 193.
30 Some examples of convergence can be quoted. Protection of employees in 
case of the employer’s insolvency draws inspiration from ILO Convention No. 173, 
in ILO, International Labour Conventions and Recommendations 1977-1995 
(1996) 374. The right to be informed on conditions of work partially recalls EC 
Directive 91/533, OJ 1991 L 288/32.
31 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Future o f the European Social 
Charter, Doc. 7980 (1998).
32 Harris, The European Social Charter and Social Rights in the European Union’, 
in L. Betten and D. MacDevitt (eds), The Protection of Fundamental Social Rights 




























































































particular, the new procedure for collective complaints should be 
looked at very closely, in view of the increasingly active role played 
by employers and labour organisations in the social policy field.
The paradox of the European debate, as we shall see further on, is 
that two core social rights explicitly expelled from the Community 
competence - namely the right to organise and the right to strike - 
are the ones better enshrined in the Council of Europe sources. It is 
the interpretation of these rights which has given rise to an 
interesting case-law of the Strasbourg Court, in convergence with 
the activity of the Committee of Independent Experts.
We shall emphasise only a few sides of this case-law, in order to 
demonstrate to which standards in concrete terms the European 
Court of Justice would have to refer, should it want - or need - to 
take into account social rights kept outside the territory of European 
law.
Article 11 of the ECHR includes the rights to ‘form and join trade 
unions’ within the more general right to ‘freedom of peaceful 
assembly and to freedom of association with others'. The most 
interesting outcome of the case-law, for the limited purpose of this 
paper, has to do with the negative freedom of association and with 
the possible expansion of the right to form a union in the direction of 
neighbouring territories, such as the right to bargain and the right to 
strike. Both developments, relevant in themselves, are marginal in 
the European debate and must be contextualised in the most 
current developments.
It is historically interesting to look at the impact of the Young, James 
and Webster decision33 on British academia and on British trade 
unions.34 The strenuous defence of the closed shop system, alien 
to the majority of continental systems, was so effective to convince 
even the most determined critics and to prove that pluralism was a
33 Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom, (1981) 4 EHRR 38.
34 Von Prondzynski, ‘Freedom of Association and the Closed Shop: the European 





























































































genuine and solid part of European traditions, in which it was 
possible to combine different forms of protection of the individual, 
while exercising his/her right to join or not to join a union.
The Conservative administrations, from 1979 onwards, in some way 
pulled out the plant by its root, progressively diminishing the role 
and the function of the closed shop. The value of the negative 
freedom, even in the light of such legislative changes, remains 
incommensurable and needs to be kept alive within the Community, 
with particular emphasis on the constitutional traditions of member 
states, which are also the result of deeply rooted practices inside 
national labour movements.
If we look at Sibson35 1993 (again a British case), we discover that it 
is not a violation of Article 11 to dismiss a vehicle driver from his 
union for reasons of dishonesty and to threaten him with strike 
action if he continued to work at the same depot, having joined 
another union. The employer requested the applicant to either 
rejoin the union or work in a different depot; both options were 
refused and a dismissal followed, which gave rise to the claim. The 
European Court, declaring that there was no violation of Article 11, 
made a significant reference to Young, a case which dealt with the 
very substance of the freedom of association’ interfering with the 
freedom guaranteed by Article 11, thus implying that Sibson did not 
and that it would be risky to expand the interpretation of the 
negative freedom.
Another series of cases touch upon breaches of Article 11 for lack 
of consultation with the unions. In National Union of Belgian 
Police36 the claim was that the Belgian Government had refused to 
classify the Union in question as representative and had not 
consulted with it on some questions related to the contract of 
employment. The Court held that the Union’s freedom to present 
claims for the lack of consultation was a sufficient sign of its 
presence and of its right to be heard. The same conclusion was
35 Sibson v. United Kingdom, (1993) 17 EHRR 193.




























































































reached in Swedish Engine Drivers Union37, whereby the alleged 
violation of Article 11 was the refusal of the negotiating body to 
conclude agreements with the applicant. The Court indicated that 
the union, once excluded from the bargaining table, could engage In 
other activities and demonstrate otherwise to be fulfilling an active 
role towards its members.
What emerges from this case law is how the Court succeeds in 
releasing the pressure to expand the scope of Article 11. The Court 
adopts a very narrow definition of freedom of association, proposing 
an individualistic rather than collective interpretation38 which could 
have the effect of lowering the potential of the freedom itself. Article 
11 is not seen as a supportive or auxiliary measure for trade unions, 
but rather as a source of individual guarantees. Intervention of the 
states is indispensable for the effectiveness of this right, which 
would, otherwise remain an empty principle.
If we move on to cases dealing indirectly with the right to strike, we 
have a clear picture of the Court’s self-restraint while engaging In 
interpretation which would overly broaden the horizon of Article'll. 
In Gustafsson,39 the applicant, not bound by any collective 
agreement and having refused to sign one regarding a labour 
market insurance scheme, was hit by a boycott declared by the 
unions and by sympathy industrial action. The Court held - by 12 
votes to seven - that Article 11 was not violated for the lack of state 
protection against strikes, which, according to the applicant, would 
have caused a limit to his freedom of association.40 The result of 
this case is that a refusal to enter negotiations and collective 
bargaining is implicitly admitted; quite a dangerous counter effect to 
the correct self-restraint of the state in not entering the delicate field 
of industrial relations.
37 Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden, (1976) 1 EHRR 617.
38 This critique addressed to the Court and Commission is presented in D.J. Harris, 
C. Warbrick and M. O’Boyle,and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (1995) 432.
39 Gustafsson v. Sweden, (1996) 22 EHRR 409.
40 Critical remarks on the applicability of Article 11 in Novitz, 'Negative Freedom of 




























































































In Schmidt and Dahlstrom41 the crucial point to decide was whether 
members of a union could be denied certain benefits, because of a 
strike to which they had not adhered. The Court had to confirm, as 
in previous cases, that the right to strike is only one of the many 
expressions of the freedom of association, having to choose 
whether to give flesh to a right which is not part of the ECHR, or 
whether to adopt a more moderate view which reduces the meaning 
of the expression 'for the protection of his interests’, referred to in 
Article 11. The Court went for a minimalist interpretation.
Only limited protection is provided and the freedom of association is 
somehow unnaturally separated by some of its own contents. The 
Court was not prepared 'to read into the Convention a code of 
industrial relations law’,42 nor to invade the territory of the ESC.
A tentative conclusion, following this brief account of the case law 
on Article 11, indicates that the lack of a fundamental social right in 
Community sources is not totally compensated for by reference to 
the ECHR. The circulation of international labour standards serves 
also the purpose to show that solutions internal to specific legal 
systems must be tailored, whenever they reflect specific traditions 
and practices.
On the road to Luxembourg new landscapes need to be discovered.
II. Globalization versus Europeanization of Social Rights
A dilemma is at the centre of what has been described as the third 
period of post-modern legal pluralism.43 Whereas in the first period 
it is relatively easy to distinguish between legal orders, in the 
second one it becomes more difficult to draw a line between state 
and non-state social regulation through law. In the third period, the
41 Schmidt and Dahlstrom v. Sweden, (1976) 1 EHRR 632.
42 J.G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of 
Human Rights (1993) 142.
43 De Sousa Santos, 'State, Law and Community in the World System: An 




























































































state becomes a ‘contested terrain’: many external constraints are 
imposed on it by trans-national practices, while there is a need to 
expand and reproduce its own role. Globalization brings about a 
contrast between the local and the trans-national which may 
threaten the solidity of fundamental rights, as if a change in legal 
tradition was an inevitable fee to pay for the opening up of wider 
and more competitive markets.
The argument to be developed in this regard, when looking at 
Europe as ‘the local’ within ‘the global’, is that there is a specificity 
of European legal culture to be maintained despite the impelling 
power of the external markets.44 This specificity emerges in an 
even clearer perspective when dealing with social rights. The main 
reasons for this can be tentatively suggested.
a) Social rights are ‘embedded’ in local traditions and reflect - 
possibly more than economic and political rights - the history of 
deeply rooted associations and interest groups. The attempt is 
being made to co-ordinate more closely national organisations 
within European associations; significant at this regard is the reform 
of the statute of ETUC, which aims at balancing the power of 
national membership in order to specify the mandate of the 
supranational confederation. In spite of all this and notwithstanding 
the active role of all interest organisations in proposing reforms and 
in ascertaining a well informed presence in the institutional debate, 
there is no new supranational culture and nothing which yet 
resembles a European labour movement. The weight of national 
traditions, very heavy for employers’ organisations too, make the 
search for a common core of interests to be defended, a very 
challenging one.
b) The institutional role of the social partners, traditionally very 
strong in most European countries, is acquiring its own standing at 
a Community level. This quasi-public function of management and 
labour, when it comes to being interlocutors of the European 
institutions, has gained ground over the years and it now results a
44 Sciarra, ‘How Global is Labour Law?’, in T. Wilthagen (ed), Advancing Theory in 



























































































coherent attitude towards social policies, as well as towards macro- 
economic policies.
This latter attitude has been particularly visible after the Maastricht 
Treaty and the enforcement of Articlel 03, on economic policies and 
criteria for their convergence45 and could, by analogy, produce 
important consequences for the implementation of employment 
policies under the Amsterdam Treaty. A practice in the consultation 
of the social partners was started, beyond the requirement of the 
law, but within a political climate prospered at Community level, 
which also reflects national practices, accurately described as 
'technical’ concertation.45
The 1998 Employment Guidelines,47 anticipating the implementation 
of the new provisions in the Treaty, openly indicate that social 
partners at all levels have an important contribution to make, the 
outcome of which will be regularly assessed every six months - as it 
was the case under the previous procedures for macro economic 
policies. They are also urged 'to conclude as soon as possible 
agreements’ at various levels, with a view to increasing all means 
indicated by the Council for 'employability’, flexibility, improving work 
organisation and the like.
45 Sciarra, note 29 above, at 208. A recent resolution of the European Council of 
13 December 1997 (OJ 1998 C 35/01) on economic policy co-ordination in stage 3 
of EMU and on Treaty articles 109 and 109b of the EC Treaty indicates that 
despite the likelihood of closer convergence of cyclical developments, as a 
consequence of EMU, wage determination should remain a national responsibility 
and yet be subject to Community surveillance should it influence monetary 
conditions. This is a meaningful indication of the implications that will be brought 
about by the single currency and by the new centralised powers of the Central 
European Bank. With regard to social partners and national collective bargaining 
the implications might be quite relevant, both in setting homogeneous wage 
standards in homogeneous sectors of the economy and in keeping inflation under 
control, in close co-ordination with the guidance which will no longer come from a 
national central bank.
46 Crouch, The Unloved but Inevitable Return of Social Corporatism’, in Festskrift 
for Voitto Helander (1997).
47 COM (97) 676 final. See also COM (98) 316 final, at 2, for examples of 




























































































c) Rather than emphasising an a-critical dependence of the social 
partners from macroeconomics, in view of the achievement of 
monetary union, attention should be paid to the co-ordination 
established between national economic policies and supranational 
targets, through the active role of unions and employers 
associations. The extraordinary opportunity offered to the social 
partners in the years to come, is for them to be actors rather than 
spectators in the launching of the single currency, while monitoring 
very closely the first stage of implementation of the new Community 
measures on employment. The historical divide between monetary 
and social policies, whereby the latter would be graded on a lower 
scale and be rarely mentioned on the political agenda, still exists 
and has been criticised while looking at recent developments of 
Community law.48 After the introduction of the single currency, this 
divide deserves new attention and requires further action on the 
side of the social partners.49
d) This analysis should be kept very central when writing an agenda 
of social rights for the new millennium. The argument developed in 
this paper is that Europe is slowly and yet unceasingly searching for 
its own political and cultural identity; this Implies the reconsideration 
of fundamental rights, as for the entitlement, the function and the 
legal enforcement of the rights themselves. The specificity of social 
rights, within the broader definition of fundamental human rights,
48 A. Calon, L. Frey, A. Lindley, A. Lyon-Caen, A. Markmann, H. Perez Diaz, and 
S. Simitis, The Social Aspects of Economic and Monetary Union, Report prepared 
for DGV of the EC (1992).
49 T. Padoa Schioppa, The Genesis of EMU: A Retrospective View, Jean Monnet 
Chair Papers 40, Robert Schuman Centre (1996). The argument in this paper is 
that the ‘inconsistent quartet’ - as the author describes the combination of fixed 
exchange rates, free trade, complete capital mobility and national independence in 
monetary policies - is what the launching of EMU should consider, transforming 
inconsistency into the reconciliation of the four elements of the quartet. The 
argument to be added is whether in such a reconciliation a fifth player should be 
included, making the quintet play the music of employment policies as well. This 
should be the implied indication when talking of co-ordination among the two 




























































































requires at times the adoption of different legal parameters and of a 
different legal language.50
If we take the points made in b) and c), we are made to face a 
practical reality, weli beyond the black letter of the law. Spaces are 
opened up for actors - the social partners -which are not mentioned 
among Community institutions. They interact with national 
governments as much as they do with the Commission, the Council, 
the Parliament, possibly with the ECJ. Procedures are informal and 
yet their transparency and well functioning becomes a crucial 
element within the complex decision-making machinery which then 
leads to opting for one particular solution or for maintaining the 
status quo. It can be argued that procedures leading to the creation 
or consolidation of political consensus are a modern - and still 
mysterious - side of supranational collective labour law.
Because of the mysteries hidden behind this new practice of 
concertation and sometimes because of the limited impact the 
social partners may have on very relevant issues, It must be 
maintained that procedures can only function at their best, when 
they rest on a solid ground of positive norms. Some of them 
constitute a pre-condition for the well functioning of the procedures 
themselves,51 some others are to be viewed as a point of arrival. 
Social rights create the natural habitat in which procedures may 
flourish and be effective; on the other hand, ways to implement 
social rights may at times be the content of procedures, thus 
representing the final result all actors should be jointly aiming at. 
We can project this last point into the new title on employment, in 
the Amsterdam Treaty and see whether it will generate similar
50 It also forces labour lawyers to fully understand and adopt the distinction 
suggested in the so-called 'Limburg Principles’, a guide for the interpretation of 
economic and social rights, as stated in the United Nations Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as far as state obligations are concerned. 
Obligations of result imply an immediate justiciability, whereas obligations of 
conduct allow this to happen over time. See Eide, note 11 above, at 39. 
Interesting implications may be envisaged for the new title on employment in the 
Amsterdam Treaty
51 See below, Recommendation No. 3 arguing in favour of the introduction of the 




























































































procedures to the ones set in motion by economic and monetary 
policies.
e) If we accept that consensus-building mechanisms and 
procedures to establish co-operation with the social partners are so 
very central for the furthering of political and economic objectives 
within the Union, we should then look at other and inter-dependent 
sides of the same machine.
This procedural apparatus inevitably ties the social partners to the 
institutions, it almost confuses different actors’ languages into a 
common expression of political intentions. In order to reconcile this 
quasi-institutional role of the social partners with well established 
legal traditions in member states, it must be argued that rights 
exercised collectively and often built on a constitutional basis at a 
national level should not be infringed, nor diminished. Although 
national collective bargaining machinery were asked to function in 
compliance with the Maastricht convergence criteria, adopting wage 
moderation as a leading criterion and helping to combat inflation, 
macroeconomic policies should not invade the social partners’ 
autonomous sphere of action, or impose on them pre-manufactured 
solutions.
At this regard, it may be interesting to quote a complaint brought by 
the Federation of Public Services of the General Union of Workers 
(FSP-UGT) and the State Federation of Teaching (FETE-UGT) 
against the government of Spain, for non-compliance with ILO 
conventions, when deciding unilaterally not to increase the salaries 
of public employees for 1997. The Committee on Freedom of 
Association, while analysing the case, mentions that the decision 
was taken ‘to protect the predominant general interests which 
require moderation of the public deficit’ and that the respect of the 
economic convergence criteria imposes a 'sacrifice painful but 
necessary’. The Committee’s recommendation indicates to the 



























































































collective bargaining, stating, however, that no infringement of ILO 
Conventions had occurred.52
f) One last example can be taken in this non-exhaustive list, which 
should serve to identify some significant ‘local’ traditions and to 
strengthen the argument that the Europeanization of social rights is 
an open process, reactive towards globalization and ‘emancipatory’, 
in its own peculiar way.53
The debate on market efficiency, on the one hand, and the 
consolidation of workers’ rights, on the other, has lit again the light 
of workers’ participation at company level. Hidden in the dossier on 
the European Company Statute, this issue has been at the center of 
a long and passionate confrontation among member states during 
the seventies and onwards. The way the debate has been recently 
re-opened in the Davignon Report54 shows that there may be an 
original way to introduce a social right, while furthering market 
integration and offering to companies the opportunity to acquire a 
European statute.
Whereas information and consultation rights have already been 
absorbed in the Community legal practice, through the Directive on 
the European Works Councils,55 participation, even in the mild and 
flexible proposal put forward in the Davignon Report, still finds 
strong opponents on its way. The importance of this controversial 
innovation may be better understood if framed within the 
consensus-building scheme previously described. Participation 
could serve the purpose of establishing good practices of industrial 
relations at company level, while being part of a wider machinery of 
bargaining and concertation. The danger, never fully admitted by
52 Case No. 1919, 308th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO 
(1997).
53 De Sousa Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception of Fluman Rights', 24 
Sociología del diritto (1997).
54 Following the appointment by the Commission of a Comité des sages and the 
publication of the final report of the group of experts, European Systems of Worker 
Involvement (May 1997).




























































































the proponents of these new rights, is that the way in which they will 
be exercised at Community level might tend to diminish the role of 
trade unions. The EWC Directive leaves the option open as to 
whether workers’ representatives should be elected or appointed 
and even attracts some criticism as to whether the exercise of 
information rights might, in the long run, pre-empt collective 
bargaining.56
Dilemmas faced by the advocates of new European social rights 
must also take into account the fear that some solid pillar in national 
buildings of rights might be seriously shaken and even collapse. 
This is where legal theory can help us again to find the right way. It 
has been argued that progressive forces which resort to human 
rights reconstitute 'the language of emancipation’ at a time when 
tensions occur between the state and civil society, as well as 
between nation states and wider legal orders, be they regional or 
global systems.57 The aim should be to adopt the emancipatory 
potential of human rights theories, apply it to social rights as part of 
this larger family of rights and prove that wherever one sees cultural 
fragmentation there must be attempts to reconstruct social relations 
around strong legal identities.
In the multicultural scenario of the European Union the 
Europeanization of social rights may create the basis for new 
emancipatory politics of rights: emancipation from the external 
impositions of the global market, emancipation from an approach to 
market-building which, as history proves, has often been the 
reflection of national interests, rather than the fulfilment of a 
common goal.
The European Union and the future stages of its integration, 
constitutes a peculiar and original response to globalization; the 
more we look at this process with the eyes of local legal traditions, 
the more we are likely to adopt emancipatory policies, for the very 
reason that they are closer to the needs of people and respectful of
56 Wedderburn, 'Consultation and Collective Bargaining in Europe: Success or
Ideology’, 26 ILJ (1997) 1-2 and 6.




























































































their cultures. The agenda of European human rights is now filled 
with new intentions and with universal aspirations; this allows us to 
turn to a more technical analysis of expected reforms and of 
changes occurring in the Amsterdam Treaty.
III. The IGC and the Treaty of Amsterdam
The debate preceding the IGC was fairly rich in relation to social 
rights and engaged both academic circles and European 
Institutions. Some of the most relevant proposals will be presented 
in this section, with the main purpose being to highlight points of 
convergence and to indicate further work that needs to be done. 
Despite the marginal impact of such proposals, some changes are 
visible in the overall philosophy inspiring the Amsterdam Treaty. If 
this perception of moderate - and yet progressive -change is 
correct, some conclusions can be drawn for the future of social 
rights and some further projects can be pursued for the years to 
come.
In a pamphlet, written by four academics and signed by a number of 
professors and experts in labour and social law from various 
countries of the European Union58, a few suggestions were 
presented to the IGC. The leading idea put forward in this proposal 
is that reformers of the Treaty could not ignore the revision of 
A rtic le 'll7 of the EC Treaty, whose Inspiration and purpose 
appeared more and more in contrast with the evolution of social 
policies. Harmonisation as a magical outcome of market integration 
could be envisaged in the early days of the Communities when, as 
previously indicated (Section 1.1, above), functional objectives were 
leading the most powerful nation states; that approach was the 
engine of a social policy which proved ancillary to market needs and 
never acquired a strong identity of its own.
It was underlined that, because of the constraints caused by market 
building, the programmatic function of Articlel 17 proved of limited
58 R. Blanpain, B. Hepple, S. Sciarra, and M. Weiss, Fundamental Social Rights: 




























































































strength in favouring legislation,59 despite the attempts made by the 
ECJ in leading cases. No mention of social policy was made 
among the activities of tne Community (Article3 ECT), neither, later 
on in the Maastricht Treaty, among the objectives of the Union 
(Article B). It Is of some significance, therefore, that the suggestion 
was made to start the whole reform process revisiting Articlel 17.
According to the authors of the proposal, ten fundamental rights 
should have been written in it. Some of them may appear 
provocative In the wording adopted and perhaps inconceivable even 
In a highly developed supranational legal system, whereby nation 
states would still be defending their spaces of sovereignty In 
adopting legislation (the right to work, the right to life-long 
education, the right to equitable remuneration); some others may be 
seen as a completion and enlargement of existing provisions (the 
right to equality of opportunity and equality of treatment, without 
distinction of any kind, the right to health and safety in the working 
environment); some others may be projected in the future, such as 
the right to protection for children, young persons, women who have 
recently given birth and the elderly, the right to personal privacy).
The inept of the suggested new Article 117, in particular, may 
attract criticism from the most disenchanted commentators, for the 
romantic reminiscence it makes of the 1944 Philadelphia 
Declaration, which became part of the ILO Constitution. 'Labour Is 
not a commodity’, as it has been recently proved in well- 
documented and enlightening scholarly work,60 is much more than a 
principle or an aim stated in an international source. It has been so 
powerful as to inspire other sources and to favour the inclusion In 
them of the right to fair remuneration for workers, 'such as will give 
them and their families a decent standard of living', as in Article 4 of
59 S. Simitls and A. Lyon-Caen, ‘Community Labour Law: A Critical Introduction to 
its History’, in Davies, Lyon-Caen, Sciarra and Simitis, note 29 above, at 4. 
References to relevant ECJ cases can be found in Poiares’ contribution to this 
volume.
60 O’Higgins, "'Labour is not a Commodity” - An Irish Contribution to International 




























































































the 1961 European Social Charter, echoed later by the Community 
Charter.
The words ‘rights' and ‘principles’ are used interchangeably in this 
document; the same semantic device is adopted by a later report, 
which will be examined shortly. Both documents, albeit with 
different expressions, make a distinction between fundamental 
rights and other objectives of social policies or ‘instrumental’ rights, 
thus distinguishing between different levels and different stages of 
implementation.61 This aspect of the overall proposal is a very 
delicate one62 and could lead to the maintenance of the status quo, 
if no precise responsibilities were set between the states and the 
Community .
The indication is also made that the 1961 Social Charter of the 
Council of Europe be referred to in Article F.2 TEU, together with 
the 1989 Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for 
Workers, following the already existing reference to the 1950 
ECHR. As for expanding the competence of the Court of Justice, 
amending Article L in the TEU, the proposal is intentionally weak. 
The proponents’ self-restraint runs parallel to the consideration that 
the hearth of very delicate institutional mechanisms could only be 
felt by political reformers, who could properly balance the expansion 
of judicial powers in this as well as in other fields of law.
The suggested new version of Articlel 17 is drawn upon common 
constitutional traditions of the member states and existing 
international labour standards. This safety net, built on the 
convergence of existing sources, is wider than Community law and 
is meant to be the reference point for the ECJ, whose responsibility 
would also be to indicate which fundamental rights are capable of 
direct effect. In order to prove the dynamic nature of the same 
rights, a new method of implementation is envisaged in assigning to
61 This point is stressed in particular by M. Weiss, Fundamental Social Rights for 
the European Union (1996) at 14-15.
62 As correctly pointed out by B. de Witte, 'Protection of Fundamental Social Rights
in the European Union: The Choice of the Appropriate Legal instrument’, in




























































































a Committee of experts the power to review regularly the 
compliance of national laws with the obligations arising from 
Articlel 17.
Finally, while suggesting the incorporation of the Maastricht Social 
Agreement into the Treaty, the authors did not go into the details of 
how the Treaty should be consolidated, since the purpose of this 
concise publication was to air the problems and to favour 
discussion. They did, however, indicate the cumbersome presence 
of Article 2(6), (excluding Community competence for the right of 
association, the right to strike and lock out, pay) in the Social 
Agreement and the need to abrogate this provision, while writing 
fundamental social rights in the Treaty.
In the second Social Action Program, adopted in April 1995, the 
Commission decided to set up a Comité des Sages, with the 
particular aim to look at the future of the Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, in the light of incoming 
reforms of the Treaties. The Comité, chaired by Maria de Lourdes 
Pintasilgo and composed of leading figures from different countries, 
decided to extend the scope of its remit and to open up to the 
consideration of broader social policy issues. The result was a very 
articulated and intense report,63 which took into account a large 
selection of topics and even indicated different stages for the 
implementation of social rights.
A point of similarity with the pamphlet examined before can once 
again be underlined, inasmuch as both documents are aware of the 
fact that for some social rights there is an urgent need to become 
visible in the treaties, whereas for others an active intervention on 
the side of individual member states is necessary. Institutional 
reforms, such as those required to amend the treaties (expand the 
qualified majority voting, insert a new chapter on employment, ban 
discrimination based on all grounds, and so on) should not be kept 
separate from other legislative reforms, for which costs are involved
63 Comité des Sages, For a Europe of Civic and Social Rights, European 




























































































in order to provide benefits and services (training and education, 
health care, work and fair conditions of work and pay, minimum 
income and pensions). The latter are, however, different kinds of 
reforms, based on the assumption of fundamental rights and 
dependent on them, but projected in the sphere of national 
legislative initiatives.
A list of eight rights is indicated which should have ‘full and 
immediate effect’: together with equality of treatment, equality 
between men and women, ban on discrimination, freedom of 
movement and the right to choose one’s occupation, some 
collective rights - so described in the most common labour law 
terminology - make an appearance, namely the right to organise 
and the right to collective bargaining and action. The 'objectives’, 
different from the rights in terms of enforceability, are described as 
long-lasting projects which should be deferred to the second stage 
as for the definition of minimum standards and contents64.
The point of contact, in terms of feasibility of both plans, albeit in 
different stages, lies in the urgency and coherence of political 
choices, which need to be made both at a supranational and at a 
national level. One of the original points of the report is the 
suggestion that, after the first stage, culminating in the work of the 
IGC preceding the Amsterdam summit, such choices should be the 
result of a widespread consultation all across Europe, favouring the 
identification and the rise of new social rights from the bottom of civil 
society to the top of the institutions. This is an insightful suggestion, 
which might be linked to the idea that there should be constant 
opportunities to review European sources, making the IGC a safe 
point of arrival of an open process, during which other mechanisms 
for adjusting and ameliorating the Treaty could be envisaged.65
While emphasising the need to open up a broad and enriching 
process of amplification for social rights, the sages are aware of the
64 Following the 'Limburg Principles', note 50 above, the ‘objectives’ indicated by 
the Sages should form the content of an obligation of conduct on the side of the 
states.




























































































judicial implications, as for the existing legal basis, with regard to 
ECJ’s competence. The report suggests, on the one hand, to 
expand the scope of Article F, including references to the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and to 
other international agreements signed by the member states; and 
on the other hand to free Article F from the restrictions of Article L 
which explicitly indicates the areas on which ECJ’s competence is 
to be exercised and which does not include Article F.
Through these proposals, the report puts forward a very lively vision 
of social Europe, not only based on new rights and principles to be 
enforced, but also supported by real people, whose voices should 
be heard and taken into account. There are signs of innovation in 
this report which go beyond the rituals of exercising political 
pressure on law-makers. Since some of the proposals have now 
become part of Community law, there is a hope that a red thread 
has been thrown and will continue to be followed in pursuing social 
goals.
In between the two proposals examined so far, a third one must be 
mentioned,66 which occupies ‘a particular place in this discussion’, in 
between academics and institutions.67 The Manifesto, written by 
academics under the auspices of the European Trade Union 
Institute, expresses both the authors’ concern for the separation of 
social from economic integration and their commitment to bringing 
about new approaches. Rather than engaging in detailed technical 
suggestions addressed to the IGC, they chose to offer a careful 
explanation of the changes that have occurred to ’work’ in the whole 
of Europe. The result is a collection of essays, attractive for a 
militant and well documented style and for melting together different 
national and professional experiences.
The Manifesto is built around the idea of incorporating the 1989 
Social Charter into the Treaty, despite the fact that it originated as a
66 B. Bercusson, S. Deakin, P. Koistinen, Y. Kravaritou, U. Muckenberger, A. 
Supiot, and B. Veneziani, A Manifesto for Social Europe (1996).
67 This is the comment by Lo Faro, The Social Manifesto: Demystifying the Spectre 




























































































contested political declaration - not signed by the UK - and was 
afterwards successfully referred to as a program for social policies, 
rather than as a declaration of fundamental rights. The authors 
argue that the nature of social and economic rights has changed 
during the 1970s and 1980s in revised constitutions of the member 
states, becoming essentially programmatic. In the light of this 
assumption, a series of alternatives is presented, as to whether the 
Charter should be 'Commission-oriented' or 'European Court’ 
oriented, ending up with the indication that in both cases it would 
have to be deeply transformed in order to be addressed to 'non- 
standard' workers, not included within its present scope.68
Especially in view of these changes, the technicalities of the 
incorporation remain unclear; the real aim of the authors is to prove 
the Charter’s lasting validity as far as the fundamental principles 
enshrined within it. Even less clear - and perhaps slightly 
contradictory69 - is the combination of this strategy with the 
incorporation of the Maastricht Social Agreement; the latter, it is 
said, should work as an implementation mechanism, whereas the 
programmatic fundamental rights would be provided for in the 
Charter.
One other publication must be mentioned, among the one 
specifically addressed to the IGC. In a book hosting the 
proceedings of a colloquium held in Amsterdam, several points of 
view are taken into account and an attempt is made to summarise 
the debate, while formulating a proposal, which does not come from 
all the authors in the book, but from the first of the two editors 
only.70 According to Betten there should be a Bill of Rights in the 
TEU, enforceable throughout the Union by way of amendment to 
Article L; the 1961 European Social Charter should be mentioned in 
Article F. As one can see, even though the proposals came from 
different circles and groups of experts, not working together at the 
same time, a few points of convergence were the result of this 
intense and diversified research.
68 Bercusson et al, note 66 above, at 149-151.
69 As implied by Lo Faro, note 67 above, at 303.




























































































Some of the issues discussed so far were echoed during the IGC 
and even amplified, leading to reforms of the Treaty which will 
certainly bring about further changes and will long be debated.
A Reflection Group chaired by Carlos Westendorp, at the time 
Spanish State Secretary for European Affairs, presented a Report71 
at the Madrid Summit, in December 1995; the group was highly 
representative of national governments and European institutions 
and proved to be an open forum for discussion.72 In this document 
the idea was put forward to rewrite Article 103 of the Maastricht 
Treaty and to include employment among the objectives of the 
Union, as one of the economic choices to be shared by member 
states.
The proposal of the Swedish representative was more precise, 
suggesting that a new title on employment should be inserted in the 
Treaty and that social partners should be involved in its 
implementation, both at a Community and at a decentralised level. 
The Finnish position was even more straightforward and indicated 
that the Union should have the obligation to examine horizontally 
employment policies and enact a European strategy, including in 
the Treaty specific provisions on monitoring the existing situation.73
71 General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference: Reflection Group report and other references for 
documentary purposes (1995).
72 Petite, 'Le traité d'Amsterdam: ambition et réalisme', RMUE No. 3 (1997) 19-20, 
and 23.
73 The Swedish position was expressed in a note of July 1995 on the fundamental 
interests of Sweden with a view to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, the 
Cabinet Office. See also the report of the Finnish Government, 27 February 1996 
on Finland's objectives for the IGC. The overall role played by Nordic countries in 
the IGC seems to have led to a very positive contribution, coming from states with 
a long lasting tradition of efficient welfare states. The British position is taken into 
account by Barnard in 'The United Kingdom, the "Social Chapter” and the 



























































































At the European Council held in Turin in March 1996 the French 
‘Memorandum pour un Model Social Européen’74 was put forward 
and specified even further the need to make employment the main 
priority for the European Union and use it as a ‘criterion’ of all 
European initiatives.
Furthermore, it is reported that the Renault-Vilvoorde case75 had a 
tremendous political impact on the discussion and pushed decisions 
forward, so that in the last two weeks the Growth and Stability Pact 
was completed on the employment side. A determined opposition 
was maintained to link formally the new employment chapter with 
EMU;76 this serious limit in the reform of the Treaty must be taken 
as a starting point for current policies and for future revisions.
A. Innovations in the Treaty of Amsterdam
It is fair to believe that a widespread circulation of ideas, like the 
one summarised before, had an impact on the IGC; this more policy 
oriented discussion had indeed been preceded by solid academic 
research in all member states, mainly oriented to prove the need for 
substantial changes in the Treaty and the limits suffered by social 
policies because of the still too strong unanimity principle.77
74 See also the Commission's position on this matter in its opinion ‘Reinforcing 
Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement’, COM (96) 90 final; and the 
European Parliaments in its resolution A4-0068/96 of 13 March 1996. OJ 1996 C 
96/77.
75 Whereby rights to information were infringed by the management of the Belgian 
company, and massive lay-offs were announced; see Moreau, ‘A propos de 
“l’affaire Renault”’, Droit Social No. 5 (1997) 493-509.
76 Observatoire social européen, Analytical Review of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
Working Paper (September 1997).
77 References cannot be exhaustive: W. Dâubler (ed), Market and Social Justice In 
the EC - the other Side of the Internal Market (1991); Wedderburn, ‘European 
Community Law and Workers Rights after 1992: Fact or Fake?’, in Lord 
Wedderburn, Labour Law and Freedom: Further Essays in Labour Law (1995); 
Lyon-Caen and Simitis, TEurope sociale à la recherche de ses références’, in 
RMUE No. 4 (1993) 109-122; Rodriguez-Pinero and Casas, ‘In support of a 
European Social Constitution', in Davies et al, note 29 above; Weiss, note 59 





























































































It is with this open minded approach that we shall look at the main 
innovations in the Amsterdam Treaty; criticism for what has not yet 
been achieved must be placed within an ongoing discussion, which 
sees academic research oriented towards an expansion of social 
rights.
a) The Treaty establishing the European Community and the Treaty 
on European Union have been consolidated and articles have been 
renumbered (references will be made to this version).78
b) Article 6 TEU (formerly Article F) refers to ECHR only. The 
choice made at Amsterdam confirms the previous position of the 
Community and of the Union with respect to the Convention: the 
Union is not subject to it, unlike all member states, but the Court of 
Justice has the power to review respect for fundamental rights by 
the Community institutions. The ECJ’s Opinion79, dealing with the 
accession by the Community to the ECHR, had a freezing effect on 
a long lasting debate. The acknowledgement, on the side of the 
Court, of the 'constitutional significance’ that the Community’s entry 
into a distinct international system would have had, was not taken 
by the IGC as an invitation to amend the Treaty; the result is that, in 
the words of the Opinion, the Community has no competence to 
accede to the ECHR.
This implies that some questions are left open. Would it still be 
desirable to establish better links between the Luxembourg and the 
Strasbourg Courts? Should the ECJ take into account the ECHR’s 
principles in a dynamic perspective and consider the case-law of the 
Court in Strasbourg as equally relevant? Would this be the only
78 Research had been carried on in this direction, in order to enhance the 
readability of European primary law and the transparency of the Community legal 
system . See ‘A Unified and Simplified Model of the European Communities 
Treaties and the Treaty on European Union in Just One Treaty’ 1996, a report 
prepared under the auspices of the Robert Schuman Centre at the EUI and 
submitted to the European Parliament in September 1996.




























































































way to verify that principles of the ECHR are truly incorporated into 
domestic legal systems? What to do in cases of non-incorporation 
of the ECHR by member states?80
c) Following a suggestion of the Reflection Group, in view of the 
accession of new states with weaker democratic traditions (see the 
amendment to Article O, setting the conditions for applicant 
countries), Article 7 brings about penalties for member states failing 
to respect fundamental rights. These measures, to be considered 
exceptional, even though the possibility to expel a member state is 
not envisaged, are - not surprisingly - kept within the competence of 
the Council.81 It could be argued that a similar measure should be 
applied for the violation of the social rights enshrined in the Treaty, 
as well as of those protected by the ECHR and by the constitutional 
traditions of member states.82 It seems unlikely that the Council 
should undergo an extensive interpretation of this norm; therefore 
the issue should be raised in relation to the new agenda and to the 
new sanctions to be thought of for the protection of social rights.
d) Article 46 (formerly Article L) in its new letter d) includes Article 
6.2 among the new areas of law within the competence of the Court. 
This amendment is little more than an optical illusion, if we consider 
that the respect for fundamental rights ‘as general principles of 
Community law’ will not change considerably the current situation. 
The Court now has such rights within the written sources to which it 
can refer; as general principles they can only inspire the Court’s 
decisions, not bind it to precise enforcement mechanisms. This 
does not lead to an incorporation of the 'rights’, but to a stronger 
relevance of the ‘principles’, albeit with two limits: the Court can only
80 For the Irish abortion case and for a thorough analysis of the open questions see 
De Burca, ‘Fundamental Human Rights and the Reach of EC Law’, 13 OJLS 
(1993) 283-319. For the British debate on incorporation see Bingham, ‘The 
European Convention on Human Rights: Time to Incorporate', in 109 LQR (1993) 
390-400. In general see B. Dickson, Human Rights and the European Convention: 
The Effect of the Convention on the United Kingdom and Ireland (1997).
81 Petite, note 72 above, at 25-26.




























































































review the acts of the institutions and must remain within the 
boundaries of its jurisdiction.
The voice of the sages has been - at least partially - listened to on 
this matter, although other articles of the Treaty, which now 
introduce the reference to the 1961 ESC, will not be covered by 
judicial review. The indirect relevance of external international 
sources puts the Court in the position to choose how and when to 
take them into consideration, incorporating the principles in its 
judgements, without being bound by the source itself. This point will 
be considered again in the recommendations83 as one of the most 
controversial items to be inserted in a new agenda for social rights.
e) Article 13 TEC, introduces a new non discrimination clause. It 
includes a very broad ban on discrimination based on the grounds 
of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and 
sexual orientation. It does not have direct effect; furthermore 
secondary legislation based on it still requires unanimity. This 
choice reflects the ambiguities of the IGC as for freeing new areas 
of social rights from the ‘unanimity trap’84. In view of further steps to 
be taken, it is now the responsibility of the member states to give 
flesh and bones to this innovative measure. Another weak side of 
this norm has to do with the merely consultative role of the 
Parliament, wanted by national delegations for the fear to be caught 
in co-decision mechanisms.85
f) As expected after the change of government in the UK, the 
Maastricht Social Agreement has been incorporated within the 
Treaty, under Title XI, which also includes articles on social policy 
from the TEC . Some of these have been deleted, either because 
they are superfluous (such is the case of Article 118a on health and 
safety) or because they are replaced by a corresponding article 
(Article 138, which also includes the former Article 118b on the so- 
called social dialogue). This new order in the relevant sources
83 See below, Recommendation No. 1.
84 Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and
European Integration', 66 Public Administration (1988) 239-278.




























































































should also favour a more dynamic approach as for the choice of 
the legal basis, although unanimity is still required for key subject 
matters, such as legislation in the case of termination of the 
employment contract, representation and collective defence of 
workers, including co-determination.86
Among the subjects to be decided with a qualified majority, social 
exclusion makes Its appearance, albeit not in the original wording, 
which included the elderly and the handicapped. This Is a field of 
remarkable potential for developments in social policies, considered 
very urgent and for which a special heading of the financial 
perspective is addressed.
g) Some incoherence can still be revealed: the last section of 
Article136 still mentions the harmonisation of social systems as an 
outcome of the functioning of the common market; the first section 
of the same article proclaims that harmonisation and Improvement 
must be maintained while pursuing the objectives of promoting 
employment, living and working conditions, whereas Article 137.2 
still mentions minimum requirements for gradual Implementation. 
The impression is that two souls are kept alive inside one body; this 
can be intriguing at times, although It should not be too difficult to 
offer a systematic interpretation of the whole new Title.
Article 136 recalls the 1961 Social Charter and the 1989 Community 
Charter (see above, under b)). This is an innovation of symbolic 
value which cannot be under-evaluated. It must be noted, however, 
in the attempt to re-establish an equilibrium among all Council of 
Europe sources, that the choice of the sedes materiae seems to 
prove that even symbols are made to have a different Impact:
86 A proposal to make qualified majority voting the rule, when deciding on all Union 
policies, was presented to the IGC by the Commission. On the contrary, the UK 
maintained throughout the IGC a strong opposition to the expansion. See 
respectively Commission Opinion, note 72 above, and Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, A Partnership of Nations: The British Approach to the
European Union Intergovernmental Conference 1996. See also the Labour Party’s 
Business Manifesto (1997) expressing unwillingness to change unanimity voting 



























































































whereas the ECHR is mentioned in Title I on Common Provisions, 
the Social Charter is placed in the niche of social provisions. 
Furthermore, the exclusion of Community competence on right of 
association, the right to strike and pay, confirmed in Articlel37.6, is 
in sharp contradiction with some of the fundamental social rights 
proclaimed by the Social Charter87. Again, we have to rely on the 
indirect relevance of international sources, which, particularly in the 
case of the right to organise and the right to strike, must be read in 
conjunction with the constitutional traditions of the member states, 
which, even if not mentioned in the opening of Title XI, are always in 
the horizon of the ECJ.
h) The new Title VIII on employment follows the Title on economic 
and monetary policy and introduces new procedures according to 
which member states and the Community ‘shall work’ together for 
the co-ordination of new strategies, within the general objectives set 
in Article 2. A 'high level of employment' is now one of the 
objectives of the Union. Relevant in itself and also in view of future 
involvement of the social partners, as it happened for economic and 
monetary policies (see above, Section 2 b) and c)), this Title is 
already being implemented, before the ratification of the Treaty. A 
special Employment Committee, with an advisory status, has been 
created (Articlel30) to promote co-ordination among member states 
and is indeed already operating, ideally in strict connection with the 
Economic Policy Committee. This is only an informal string, which 
should bind together two key bodies, potentially very important in 
view of achieving formal co-ordination in the two policy fields. The 
Committee should also monitor employment initiatives in Member 
States, while consulting with the social partners. We are clearly 
facing a situation in which multi-level policy making is conceived by 
a variety of institutional and quasi-institutional actors. This open- 
ended procedure, whereby it is difficult to conceive a ‘right to work’ 
in traditional terms, does not specify sanctions against Member 
States, neither specific enforcement mechanisms for individual 
rights.
87 Similarly Ryan, 'Pay, Trade Union Rights and European Community Law’, Int. 




























































































Activism on the side of the Commission is expressed through soft 
law measures which have preceded the employment chapter88 and 
which are now part of the implementation of the same.89
IV. Concluding Remarks: Further Proposals to Expand Social
Rights in the Human Rights Agenda for the Year 2000
In the course of this paper an empirical debate has been confronted 
with a more theoretical approach. The latter can be summarised in 
two points:
1) The strategy to incorporate broad international legal principles 
into the European legal order is still a current one, as it results from 
some of the innovations in the Amsterdam Treaty. Especially when 
related to social rights, this strategy brings about the idea of 
adaptation of international sources to distinctly European legal 
traditions.90 It also proves that member states belonging to a wider 
international legal order have potential advantages In making 
recourse to sources different from Community sources. From 
Strasbourg to Luxembourg, passing through Geneva, the road is 
paved with good intentions, but travelling across these places may 
still not be an easy task for the individual citizen, whose rights are 
infringed or threatened.
2) The ‘emancipatory’ function of human rights, as opposed to the 
mere dependency of the same on market mechanisms, helps legal 
scholarship to re-discover the centrality of social rights and to look 
ahead for new measures to strengthen their enforcement. In
88 COM (95) 273 final.
89 COM (97) 676 final.
90 It would suffice to quote Article 23 of the Universal Declaration (right to work, to 
free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to 
protection against unemployment, right to equal pay for equal work, right to just 
and favourable remuneration) in order to have a sufficiently broad floor of rights 
from which the European legislature should draw inspiration. The concept of 
adaptation of international sources is used in this paper as equivalent to that of 
convergence: both concepts imply that initiatives should not be taken at the 





























































































particular, the European Union represents a test of how to create an 
internal coherence among principles and objectives, thus offering an 
answer to the dispersion of legal values and the weakening of rights 
within the global legal order.
Emancipatory theories should modify the definition of rights at the 
place of work, as well as the expansion of minimum standards 
world-wide.
In interpreting Community sources and in tracing new policies, the 
challenge is to reconcile the old and the new: in the wider circle of 
international sources, Community sources are included and form a 
smaller circle, delimited by its own circumference.91 In the process 
of European integration the adoption of new social rights is very 
slow and may not coincide with the emergence of new rights which 
expand the circumference of the wider circle.
It can be argued that an emancipatory theory of social rights in the 
European Union rests on all the rights mentioned in the Treaty and 
on those indirectly included in it through the free and discretionary 
interpretation of the Court of Justice. The fact that the latter must 
also take into account the ‘constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States’ as a further and necessary criterion in its decisions, 
forces the ‘emancipatory’ theory to go a step forward and to insist 
on the peculiarities of the European debate. The most suitable 
suggestion for the years to come is that the concentric circles be 
kept as they are, the smaller included in the wider one and yet 
autonomous with regard to the implementation of social rights and 
for reviewing acts of the Community in breach of international 
standards. The surface common to the two circles could become 
an even more homogeneous ground for the ECJ, if other reviewing 
mechanisms were introduced into the scene. These new bodies 
should have the function to fill in the ground with converging and 
coherent standards, through interpreting all relevant legal sources 
and closely following their implementation in member states.
91 The metaphor of concentric circles has been used by Lenaerts and re­
interpreted here. See Lenaerts, ‘Fundamental Rights to be Included in a 




























































































Out of the metaphor of the circles, the indication can be drawn to 
strengthen those sources within the smaller circle, by way of 
insertion of some fundamental social rights in the Treaty and by 
ensuring the appropriate means of enforcement, especially through 
new monitoring mechanisms.
The remarkably rich and varied range of proposals circulated before 
the IGC and the innovations in the Amsterdam Treaty continue to 
leave unanswered several questions. Only a few points will be 
selected as urgent items to be inserted in the agenda for the year 
2000, in the understanding that institutional reforms have wider 
priorities than the ones indicated in this paper.
V. Recommendations
1. In the Amsterdam Treaty references are made to the ECHR and 
the ESC. This indirect inclusion of international sources into the 
Treaty - which could also be described as a tendency to 
convergence - leaves untouched the competence of the Strasbourg 
Court on the ECHR and the monitoring of the ESC by the 
Committee of Independent Experts, while expanding the standards 
to which the ECJ may refer. There is no indication in the Treaty that 
the concrete implementation of human rights should inspire the 
ECJ, even less bind it. The ECJ’s opinion on accession by the 
Community to the ECHR reflects a careful internal balance among 
institutional powers and frees the ECJ from obedience to the rulings 
of institutions external to it.
Furthermore, the limited consideration shown by the IGC for 
amending Article L TEU, with regard to the expansion of the ECJ's 
competence, is a strong political indication, inspired perhaps by 
realism. It is also coherent with the choice of the EU not to accede 
to the ECHR. The fear has prevailed that two legal orders 
governing fundamental rights, running parallel to each other for 




























































































Rather than insisting on the politically impracticable solution aimed 
at expanding the ECJ’s competence, efforts should be concentrated 
on the creation of new bodies, similar to the European Social 
Charter’s Committee of Independent Experts.92 It has been 
correctly underlined that when referring to a source external to the 
EU, its entire range should be kept present, particularly with regard 
to its concrete translation into the living law of the states bound by 
it.93 The suggestion is not to duplicate procedures, but to make 
them converge towards institutional co-operation. In concrete 
terms, the new body should have both monitoring powers and 
powers to refer to the Commission, when infringements of social 
rights are discovered. It should be built within the Community legal 
order and include representatives from other international 
organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the ILO, thus 
enhancing convergence of international standards.
If an analogy with Article 7 of the Amsterdam Treaty were to be 
drawn, one could envisage that this monitoring mechanism could 
also bring, in exceptional cases, to the indication of sanctions to be 
applied to Member States failing to respect fundamental social 
rights.
2. References in the Amsterdam Treaty to the 1989 Social Charter 
cannot be compared to the ones made to Council of Europe 
sources. Notwithstanding the symbolic value attached to this 
innovation, we should not confuse the legal nature of these different 
sources. The Community Charter remains a programmatic and 
political document which has given flesh and bones to Community 
social policies; it will need to be revised also in the light of the 
achievements made so far in adopting legislation in various fields 
and in view of new emerging needs, especially related to active 
employment policies. A careful reading of the Charter confirms the 
validity of the two levels of analysis previously suggested in the 
search for new and more efficient means of implementation of social 
rights. What the Sages describe as different stages in what should
92 See the proposal by Blanplain et al„ note 58 above, and the further indications 
of the report by the Sages, note 63 above.




























































































be a new and beneficial reform of the Treaty are indeed different 
levels of legal analysis and force us to re-consider the distribution of 
powers within the Union and the member states.
The Protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty should be 
interpreted in innovative terms, when it comes to considering social 
rights. Article 5 indicates that Community action is justified when 
the objectives in question cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
Member states’ action. This difficult balancing exercise is facilitated 
by some guidelines, which would need to be read in the light of a 
broad program of action, a new social rights agenda for the 
Commission, with the indication of political priorities.
In particular, following Article 5 of the Protocol, in order to justify 
Community action, the transnational relevance of the issue should 
be recalled as well as the possible conflict with the requirements of 
the Treaty, due to lack of Community action, such as to correct 
distortion In competition or to strengthen economic and social 
cohesion.
Employment is again the field to investigate for an innovative 
definition of the borderline between the powers of the Community 
and of the Member States, in the light of Article 5 of the Amsterdam 
Treaty (formerly Article 3b EC), which must be looked at as the 
most solid constitutional ground for subsidiarity. In this field a 
regime of shared competences, such as the one which is taking 
shape in this early stage of enforcement of the new Title VIII, opens 
up space for yet a new form of co-ordination of policies. It should 
be maintained, though, that an incumbent and unavoidable priority 
must be given to Community action and such a power must be 
accompanied by precise monitoring mechanisms on national 
employment plans.
3. The peculiar nature of certain social rights (collective rights, 
procedural rights), confirms that a mere abstention of the nation 
states - or of the EC as such - could not suffice to guarantee a true 




























































































recently, the right to information and consultation are examples of 
individual rights to be exercised collectively, which, because of this 
peculiarity, can only be enforced through legislation at the national 
level. Emancipation consists in providing deep Community roots for 
social rights and, at the same time, assigning competencies to 
national and supranational legislatures.
It must be maintained that what for some commentators appears to 
be the most daring reform of the Treaty and for others the most 
unnecessary, namely to insert the right to organise among the EU 
fundamental social rights, is indeed the most urgent and important 
one.
Several reasons support this recommendation:
• this right would acquire a new function in an evolving 
supranational legal order, whereby private associations are asked 
to be present and active and to fulfil quasi-institutional roles
• this fundamental right, as suggested earlier on,94 does not receive 
sufficient support from the mere convergence of other 
international sources. Its specificity within the European legal 
debate can certainly be drawn from constitutional traditions in the 
member states, but an even more specific function is emerging at 
Community level, where the right to organise appears as a pre­
condition for exercising other collective rights (the right to bargain, 
the right to be informed and consulted) which are at the moment 
lacking full institutional legitimisation. In adopting again the 
distinction between freedoms and powers, suggested earlier on,95 
the fundamental right to organise would fall in the second 
category and require specific supportive legislation at Community 
level.
A renewed and stronger legitimacy of supranational associations, 
whose representativity should be ascertained following the criteria 
established in soft law, would also entitle them to new rights, such
94 See the criticism of Article 11 ECHR, as it emerges from the case-law of the 
Strasbourg Court. Part I, Section C, above.




























































































as introducing collective complaints when social rights are infringed 
by member states as well as when no sufficient action is taken to 
allow the correct exercise of the rights themselves. It would be 
advisable that such complaints were filed with the Commission, 
whose monitoring exercise on the state of enforcement of social 
rights should become even more alert and punctual.
The Council of Europe Social Charter will undergo changes in the 
years to come, to which attention should be paid. Particularly the 
new procedure on collective complaints could prove a useful 
analogy and an occasion for bringing closer international standards 
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